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BALANCING ERISA'S ANTI-ALIENATION PROVISIONS 
AGAINST GARNISHMENT OF A CONVICTED CRIMINAL'S 
RETIREMENTS FUNDS: UNSCRAMBLING THE 
APPROACHES TO PROTECTING THE RETIREMENT NEST 
EGG* 
Alan K. Ragant 
In marble walls as white as milk, lined with a skin as soft as silk; 
Within a fountain crystal clear, a golden apple doth appear. 
No doors there are to this strong-hold. Yet things break in and steal 
the gold. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)2 
is a comprehensive statutory scheme designed to protect the interests 
of employee benefit plan participants and beneficiaries. 3 Pensions 
generally are regarded as one of the legs in the three-legged 
retirement fund stool, along with social security and personal 







One etymologist explains the origin of the term nest egg as follows: "Before the days 
of scientific egg production, farmers would place a fake egg, made of porcelain or 
white glass, in the hens' nests, which supposedly encouraged the appearance of more 
real eggs. A financial nest egg will, hopefully, lead to the appearance of more 
money." ROBERT CLAIBORNE, LOOSE CANNONS, RED HERRINGS, AND OTHER LOST 
METAPHORS 165 (1988). 
Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. The author expresses 
sincere gratitude for the efforts and comments of Professor Patricia E. Dilley of the 
University of Florida Levin College of Law and Professors Christopher Roederer and 
Susan Harthill of Florida Coastal School of Law, who reviewed an early draft of this 
article. A special thank you also goes to the author's able research assistant, Heath 
Vickers. Any errors or omissions are the author's. 
THE NURSERY RHYMES OF ENGLAND 81 (James Orchard Halliwell ed., London, John 
Russell Smith 1846), available at http://www.presscom.co.uk/nursery/nurs4th.html. 
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006)). 
ERISA§ 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001. 
Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-
Legged Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REv. 
938, 939 (2007); John K. Eason, Retirement Security Through Asset Protection: The 
Evolution of Wealth, Privilege, and Policy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 159, 176 (2004); 
63 
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in old age, while allowing for varying degrees of maintenance of a 
retiree's lifestyle.5 In support of this concept, one of ERISA's 
controversial provisions prohibits assignment or alienation of 
retirement plan benefits.6 Since 1974, the courts and Congress have 
wrestled with how to balance the desire to preserve ERISA retirement 
funds for ultimate use by participants and their beneficiaries against 
equitable claims against such funds brought by third parties. 7 
Despite the simplicity and possible allure of a complete bar to the 
alienation of pension benefits, it would be unreasonable to prevent 
diversion of plan funds for certain situations such as divorce or 
criminal activity. In recognition of this balancing of interests, 
Congress amended ERISA in 1984 to allow alienation where the 
spouse of a pension plan member obtained an order relating to child 
support, alimony, or marital property rights under specific 
circumstances (Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDR0)).8 
When numerous federal district and appellate courts attempted to 
override ERISA' s "anti-alienation" or "spendthrift" provisions in 
circumstances involving plan administrators who embezzled from a 
plan or otherwise breached fiduciary duties, the Supreme Court 
rejected such judicially crafted attacks and stated, "[i]f exceptions to 
this policy are to be made, it is for Congress to undertake that task."9 
Congress responded by amending ERISA in 1997 to allow 
assignment and alienation where plan participants are ordered to 
reimburse the plan following an adjudication of liability, upon 
conviction for malfeasance concerning the plan, or based on a 
settlement entered into by the plan participant and the Secretary of 
Labor or the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation for breach of a 
fiduciary duty involving the plan. 10 
Some recent decisions relied on the federal Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act (MVRA) 11 as a permissible means of alienating 
Nancy J. Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies: Nondiscrimination, 
Integration, and the Quest for Worker Security, 42 TAX L. REv. 433, 501-{)2 (1987). 
5. Eason, supra note 4, at 176-77. 
6. ERISA§ 206(d), 29 U.S.C. § l056(d) (2006); I.R.C. § 401(a)(l3) (2006) (generally 
referred to as either the "anti-alienation" or "spendthrift" clause). See Ablamis v. 
Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1454 (9th Cir. 1991). 
7. See infra Part 11.8-C. 
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3); I.R.C. § 40l(a)(l3)(B); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-
13(g) (as amended in 1988). 
9. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat') Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990), quoted 
in Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 765 (1992). 
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4); I.R.C. § 40l(a)(I3)(C); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-
13(t) (as amended in 1988). 
11. 18 u.s. c. §§ 3663A, 3664 (2006). 
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ERISA pension funds even though the criminal activity bore no 
relationship to the victim's retirement. 12 This article looks at 
ERISA's anti-alienation provtston, including its history, 
interpretation, and application, and addresses arguments for and 
against using the MYRA to create an exception to ERISA's anti-
alienation provision. Part I summarizes the background that preceded 
the congressional enactment of ERISA, as well as the varied results 
reached by courts faced with interpreting the Spendthrift Clause. Part 
II looks at the recognized exceptions to ERISA's Spendthrift 
Provisions--exceptions that are noncontroversial either because of 
their inclusion within ERISA 13 or their generally unquestioned 
acceptance by the courts. 14 Part III discusses recent decisions that 
have addressed whether the MYRA creates an exception to ERISA's 
prohibition against assignment or alienation. Part IV examines the 
arguments and policy considerations for and against an MYRA-based 
exception to ERISA's spendthrift provisions, concluding that the 
competing policy considerations of protecting retirement funds 
versus providing restitution reveal that the MYRA is an incomplete 
means of balancing the equities of pensioners and victims. Congress 
should amend ERISA to incorporate a spendthrift exception for 
qualified criminal restitution orders, similar to that which exists for 
QDROs. Such a limited carve-out from the anti-alienation provisions 
should allow recovery under specific circumstances from the pension 
funds of a criminal subject to an order of restitution, regardless of 
whether such an order originated in a state or federal prosecution. 
12. See United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Miller, 588 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795-97 (W.D. Mich. 2008); United States v. James, 312 
F. Supp. 2d 802, 804-05 (E. D. Va. 2004). 
13. See, e.g., l.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (allowing certain participant 
and beneficiary loans, as well as voluntary and revocable assignments of future 
benefits not to exceed ten percent of a benefit payment once the benefits are in pay 
status, to be included in a qualified trust); see also I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(l3)(B), 414(p); 29 
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(iii) (providing an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provisions 
for QDROs); I.R.C. § 40l(a)(13)(C); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4) (establishing a 
spendthrift exception for breaches of fiduciary duty or criminal activity involving the 
plan). 
14. See, e.g., Mcintyre v. United States, 222 F.3d 655, 659-60 (9th Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Sawaf, 74 F.3d 119, 122-25 (6th Cir. 1996); Shanbaum v. United States, 32 
F.3d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that ERISA's anti-alienation provisions did not 
bar the Internal Revenue Service from levying against an individual's pension plan 
assets); United States v. Rogers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 774, 785-86 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Events Leading to ERISA-Foxes in the Hen House 
Congressional enactment of ERISA in 1974 represented the 
culmination of a presidential study commissioned twelve years 
earlier. 15 In a March 28, 1962 memorandum establishing the 
Committee on Corporate Pension Funds and Other Private 
Retirement and Welfare Programs, President John F. Kennedy 
provided no direct indication of the turbulent economic events 
prompting the Committee's formation. 16 The President's 
memorandum merely alluded to his frrst Economic Report to 
Congress, delivered in January 1962, which called for a "reappraisal 
of legislation" governing corporate pension funds and other private 
retirement programs, 17 and charged the Committee "to review 
legislation and administrative practice relating to [private retirement] 
programs." 18 The economic setting was known only too well to the 
executive, Congress, Committee members, and the nation at large, 
but dire events were unfolding even as the Committee commenced its 
work. 19 
For a decade and a half following the end of World War II, the 
United States avoided a major economic depression but suffered four 
recessions. 20 Measures for strengthening the fmancial system--and 
consequently the economy-included scrutiny of and change to the 
nation's private retirement systems.21 In 1963, during what might be 
described as America's worst pension crisis since American Express 
15. William J. Chadwick & David S. Foster, Federal Regulation of Retirement Plans: The 
Quest for Parity, 28 V AND. L. REv. 641, 668 (1975). 
16. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE RETIREMENT 
AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS: A 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS app. C 
(President's Memo dated Mar. 28, 1962) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office 1965) (hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM.]. 
17. Economic Report of the President, 1962 EcoN. REP. PRES. 3, 23 (Jan. 1962). 
18. PRESIDENT's COMM., supra note 16, at app. C. The memorandum also directed the 
Committee to review "the implications of the growing retirement and welfare funds 
for the financial structure of the economy, as well as ... the role and character of the 
private pension and other retirement systems in the economic security system of the 
nation," and to consider "how they may contribute more effectively to efficient 
manpower utilization and mobility." Id 
19. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A 
POLITICAL HISTORY 73-87 (2004). 
20. Economic Report of the President, supra note 17, at 4. 
21. /d. at 17,21-25. 
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created the country's first pension system in 1875/2 Studebaker-
Packard closed its South Bend, Indiana plant and terminated its 
employee pension plan.23 Over 4,000 workers, ranging from forty to 
sixty years old, lost roughly eighty-five percent of the value of their 
vested retirement benefits. 24 Another low point during the 1960s and 
1970s occurred when the Teamsters Union misused tens of millions 
of dollars in the Central States pension funds amid allegations of 
improper investments and organized criminal activity. 25 Although the 
1960s ushered in a new era of hope, as demonstrated in the 
President's Economic Report to Congress, much remained to be 
done.26 
Hearings were being conducted on Capitol Hill, but legislation was 
slow in coming. In 1967, Senator Jacob Javits introduced a pension 
reform bill that would evolve into ERISA. 27 After years of surveys, 
studies, reports, and hearings-and against significant opposition 
from business and labor groups-ERISA was enacted and signed into 
law on Labor Day 1974.28 Although ERISA's initial focus primarily 
involved pension plans, over the next several decades, Congress 
amended ERISA to cover other retirement vehicles, as well as health 
and welfare benefit plans. 29 With regard to covered retirement plans, 
22. Patrick W. Sebum, Evolution of Employer-Provided Defined Benefit Pensions, 114 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 16, 16-17 (1991) (citing I MURRAY W. LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL 
PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 21-22 (1932)). 
23. S. REP. No. 93-383, at 78-79 (1973); Private Pension Plans: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Comm., 89th Cong., 103-106, 123 
(1966) (statement of Clifford M. MacMillan, Vice President, Studebaker 
Corporation). 
24. /d. 
25. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPORT TO THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 
COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE DEPT. OF LABOR'S OVERSIGHT OF THE 
MANAGEMENT OF THE TEAMSTERS' CENTRAL STATES PENSION AND HEALTH AND 
WELFARE FUNDS app. I, 2-3 (1985); see also Mary Williams Walsh, Teamsters Find 
Pensions at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at AI ("In the 1960's and 1970's, the 
Teamsters' huge Central States pension fund was a wellspring of union corruption. 
Tens of millions of dollars were loaned to racketeers who used the money to gain 
control of Las Vegas casinos. Administrative jobs were awarded to favored insiders 
who paid themselves big fees. A former Teamster president and pension trustee was 
convicted of trying to bribe a United States senator."). 
26. Economic Report of the President, supra note 17, at 3-4. 
27. Pension and Employee Benefit Act of 1967, § 1103, 90th Cong. (1967). 
28. See WooTEN, supra note 19, at 241-70. 
29. See generally Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
364, 94 Stat. 1210 (1980); Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 
95 Stat. 172 ( 1981 ); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 
97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 
Stat. 494 (1984); Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 
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ERISA's extensive rules include standards of conduct for fiduciaries, 
reporting and disclosure provisions, and measures aimed at protecting 
plan funds and ensuring the ultimate receipt of funds by qualified 
participants and beneficiaries. 30 
B. The Spendthrift Provision's Deceptively Simple Language and 
Vague Underlying Policy-Well-Hidden Eggs 
According to the legislative findings codified in ERISA's initial 
section, the congressional rationale for enactment included a 
determination that "the continued well-being and security of millions 
of employees and their dependents are directly affected by [employee 
benefit] plans."31 As part of the comprehensive rules regulating 
employee benefits, the statute contains a provision relating to anti-
alienation, which specifies that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide 
that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or 
alienated."32 A corresponding provision in I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A) 
states that "[a] trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under [I.R.C. 
§ 401] unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that 
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated."33 
Neither ERISA nor the related I.R.C. sections supply meanings for 
the terms "assign" or "alienate." Instead, Treasury Regulations 
collectively defme "'assignment' and 'alienation"' to include 
payment of the employee's plan benefits to the employer and any 
arrangement by a participant or beneficiary giving his or her interest 
(1984); Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986); Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 237 (1986); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
30. 29 u.s.c. §§ 1021, 1082, 1103, 1104 (2006). 
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2006). 
32. 29 u.s.c. § 1056(d)(1) (2006). 
33. I.R.C. § 40l(a)(13)(A)(2006). The Code continues: 
!d. 
For purposes of the preceding sentence, there shall not be taken 
into account any voluntary and revocable assignment of not to 
exceed I 0 percent of any benefit payment made by a participant 
who is receiving benefits under the plan unless the assignment or 
alienation is made for purposes of defraying plan administration 
costs. For purposes of this paragraph a loan made to a participant 
or beneficiary shall not be treated as an assignment or alienation if 
such loan is secured by the participant's accrued nonforfeitable 
benefit and is exempt from the tax imposed by section 4975 
(relating to tax on prohibited transactions) by reason of section 
4975(d)(l). 
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in any part of the plan to a third party.34 The regulations also list five 
arrangements that will not fall within the rubric of assignment or 
alienation35 and two general categories of exceptions to the 
proscription against assignment or alienation. 36 
The statute and legislative history yield almost no clues as to the 
intent behind ERISA's anti-alienation provision. The Report of the 
House Ways and Means Committee contains only a limited reference 
to alienation in its explanation of the statute's provisions: 
To further ensure that the employee's accrued benefits are 
actually available for retirement purposes, the committee 
bill also contains a provision requiring the plan to provide 
that benefits may not be assigned or alienated. (Of course, 
this provision is not intended to prevent the transfer of 
benefit rights from one qualified plan to another.Y7 
Since 1974, ERISA's anti-alienation provisions have undergone 
significant legislative modification, while the courts and governing 
agencies have struggled to defme the correct parameters of anti-
alienation. 38 
34. Treas. Reg.§ 1.40l(a)-13(c)(l) (as amended in 1988). 
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.40l(a)-13(c)(2) (excluding the following "[s]pecific arrangements" 
from '"assignment' and 'alienation"': federal, state, or local tax withholdings on 
benefit payments; recovery of overpayments; transfer of benefit rights between plans; 
direct deposit of benefit payments; and recapture of certain payments). 
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.40l(a)-13(d) (exempting from the rule against assignment and 
alienation (1) a voluntary, revocable assignment by a beneficiary or participant 
receiving payments of not more than ten percent in the aggregate of any future 
payment provided that the assignment is not to defray plan administration costs, and 
(2) benefits alienated or assigned as security for plan loans under certain conditions). 
37. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, at 68 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4734. 
38. See generally Dana M. Muir, Contemporary Social Policy Analysis and Employee 
Benefit Programs: Boomers, Benefits, and Bargains, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1351, 
1389-1405 (1997) (explaining that interpretation of ERISA's prohibition against 
assignment and alienation has "proven far more difficult than the relatively simple 
sounding description indicates"). 
70 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 39 
C. The Supreme Court's Views on Anti-Alienation-"The Egg 
Seems to Get Further A way "39 
Following the enactment of ERISA, federal courts wrestled in 
general with interpreting and applying such a comprehensive statute, 
and in particular with the Act's prohibition on assignment and 
alienation. The paucity of legislative guidance on the meaning and 
Cl ntours of assignment or alienation raised questions as to whether 
pension plan funds could be reached by bankruptcy creditors,40 
victims of criminal misconduct,41 spouses and former spouses,42 or a 
plan itself to recover from a breaching fiduciary. 43 Not surprisingly, 
39. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 
111-12 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1872), available at 
http://www. sabian.orgl Alice/lgchap05.htm: 
"I should like to buy an egg, please," she said timidly. 
"How do you sell them?" 
"Fivepence farthing for one-twopence for two," the Sheep 
replied. 
"Then two are cheaper than one?" Alice said in a surprised 
tone, taking out her purse. 
"Only you must eat them both, if you buy two," said the 
Sheep. 
"Then I'll have one, please," said Alice, as she put the 
money down on the counter. For she thought to herself, "They 
mightn't be at all nice, you know." 
The Sheep took the money, and put it away in a box: then 
she said "I never put things into people's hands-that would 
never do-you must get it for yourself." And so saying, she went 
off to the other end of the shop, and set the egg upright on a she!£ 
"I wonder why it wouldn't do?'' thought Alice, as she 
groped her way among the tables and chairs, for the shop was 
very dark towards the end. "The egg seems to get further away 
the morel walk towards it." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
40. ·Compare In re Harline, 950 F.2d 669, 674 (lOth Cir. 1991) (concluding that ERISA 
exempted pension funds from bankruptcy estate), with In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352, 
1360 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the argument that ERISA's anti-alienation provision 
barred inclusion of debtor's pension funds in bankruptcy). 
41. Ellis Nat'! Bank of Jacksonville v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466, 470-71 (2d Cir. 
1986) (analyzing, but refusing to adopt, a "criminal misconduct" exception to 
ERISA's prohibition on assigrunent or alienation). 
42. Compare Francis v. United Tech. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84, 88 (N.D. Cal. 1978) 
(holding that ERISA did not provide a cause of action for a non-employee spouse's 
claim against a retirement fund), with Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1156 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (reasoning that in passing ERISA, Congress did not intend to 
"insulate a breadwinner from the valid support claims of spouse and offspring"). 
43. Compare St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 552 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(characterizing theft from pension fund as basis for an equitable exception to ERISA's 
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the federal judiciary divided into two camps. One view held that the 
proper role of the courts included application of equity in certain 
situations to create exceptions to ERISA's broad anti-alienation 
language. As expressed by the Eleventh Circuit: "There is no reason 
to conclude that ERISA requires the abrogation of the equitable 
principle that a wrongdoer should not benefit from his misdeeds."44 
The opposing view regarded protection of an employee's pension as 
the "fundamental" congressional objective. In addition to the 
difficulty in deciding which litigants to exempt from the anti-
alienation rule, one appeals court concluded that "even a narrow 
judicially created 'criminal misconduct' exception would undermine, 
rather than promote, the stability of the pension plan and its employee 
members by creating uncertainty and potentially delayed receipt or 
non-receipt of promised benefits."45 
In 1990 the Supreme Court concluded that ERISA's anti-alienation 
provisions protected a union official's pension benefits from 
equitable attack even though the official was convicted of embezzling 
union funds. 46 Curtis Guidry, a union chief executive officer and 
pension fund trustee, pleaded guilty to pocketing close to $400,000 in 
union pension money.47 Although ERISA's anti-alienation 
provisions precluded garnishment of pension funds, the district court 
reasoned that by reading ERISA in pari materia with section 501(c) 
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,48 
the damage to the union pension fund caused by Guidry's "knavery" 
justified an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation requirement.49 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the 
district court's decision and upheld the constructive trust imposed by 
non-alienation provision), with Vink v. SHY N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 
268, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (refusing to recognize a fraud exception to ERISA's anti-
alienation provision that would enable a company to attach a defrauding employee's 
pension fund). See also Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'! Pension Fund, 493 
U.S. 365, 376-77 (1990), superseded by statute, Mandatory Victims Restitution Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, II 0 Stat. 1227 ( 1996); Crawford v. La Boucherie 
Bernard, Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
44. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 752 F.2d at 552. 
45. Ellis Nat 'I Bank, 786 F.2d at 471. 
46. Guidry, 493 U.S. at 367, 376. 
47. /d. at 367. 
48. Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 501(c), 73 Stat. 536 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) 
(2006)) ("Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or 
converts to his own use, or the use of another, any of the moneys, funds, securities, 
property, or other assets of a labor organization of which he is an officer, or by which 
he is employed, directly or indirectly, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or 
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both."). 
49. Guidry, 493 U.S. at 370. 
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the district court on Guidry's undistributed pension benefits. 50 The 
appellate court deemed it unlikely that Congress intended courts to 
ignore "'equitable principles'" and thereby shield individuals such as 
Guidry from being fiscally accountable for their misdeeds. 51 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts and observed 
that ERISA' s anti-alienation provision "reflects a considered 
congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of 
income for pensioners (and their dependents, who may be, and 
perhaps usually are, blameless), even if that decision prevents others 
from securing relief for the wrongs done them. "52 Rejecting the 
practicability of defming equitable exceptions to ERISA's anti-
alienation that would not "swallow the rule," the Court stated "that 
the identification of any exception should be left to Congress."53 The 
Court neglected to address the obvious difficulty in expecting 
legislators to fashion prospective anti-alienation exceptions when the 
judiciary arguably would be better equipped to tailor remedies in 
individual cases based on specific facts and circumstances. 54 The 
Court's observation that "[i]t makes little sense to adopt such a policy 
and then to refuse enforcement whenever enforcement appears 
inequitable"55 raises the possibility that even if Congress amended 
ERISA's anti-alienation language to give courts the discretion to craft 
equitable exceptions, such legislatively-granted leeway might be 
impermissibly vague. 56 
Two years after the Guidry decision, the Court again decided a case 
involving alienation in the context of ERISA. In Patterson v. 
Shumate, 57 the issue centered on the interaction between ERISA and 
the Bankruptcy Code; specifically, whether ERISA's anti-alienation 
provisions were a transfer restriction "enforceable under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law"58 such that the debtor could exclude his interest 
50. !d. 
51. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'! Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457, 1460 (lOth Cir. 
1988), rev'd, 493 U.S. 365 (1990)). 
52. Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376. 
53. !d. at 377. 
54. See, e.g., Crawford v. La Boucherie Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
55. Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376-77. 
56. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 158-59 (1974) (discussing constitutional 
challenges to a noncriminal statute based on overbreadth and vagueness). 
57. 504 U.S. 753 (1992). 
58. The Bankruptcy Code places trust property subject to transfer restrictions outside the 
bankruptcy estate: "A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in 
a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case 
under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 54l(c)(2) (2006). 
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in a pension plan from the bankruptcy estate. 59 During a period 
spanning more than 30 years, Joseph B. Shumate, Jr., rose through 
the ranks at Coleman Furniture Company to become its president, 
chairman of the board of directors, and majority shareholder.60 After 
Coleman Furniture's bankruptcy proceeding was converted from 
Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, Shumate began experiencing personal 
financial difficulties, eventually resulting in his own Chapter 7 
filing. 61 The trustee of Shumate's bankruptcy estate sought to compel 
Coleman Furniture's bankruptcy trustee to tum over Shumate's 
$250,000 interest in Coleman Furniture's pension plan to Shumate's 
bankruptcy trustee for the benefit of Shumate's creditors.62 Writing 
for the Court as he had in Guidry, Justice Blackmun once more 
focused on ERISA's statutory language that "'[e]ach pension plan 
shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be 
assigned or alienated. "'63 
In reconciling the applicable ERISA and Bankruptcy Code 
terminology, the Court paid little attention to ERISA's policies other 
than to reiterate that Congress intended to safeguard pension 
income.64 The Justices failed to address ERISA's countervailing goal 
of preventing the manipulation of pension funds by the wealthy. 65 
The narrow question focused on by the Court-the degree to which 
ERISA's anti-alienation language could be read to protect all pension 
assets--obscured consideration of the more fundamental question of 
the degree to which pension trusts, particularly those representing 
sums well beyond an individual's basic needs in retirement, should 
be protected.66 Although Patterson settled the debate on whether 
ERISA pension plans formed part of the debtor's estate in 
bankruptcy, the Court's use of the misnomer "ERISA-qualified 
plans"67 added to the confusion and may have played a role in 
obscuring the fundamental policy underpinnings of whether and to 
what extent a pension fund should be insulated from the reach of 
59. Patterson, 504 U.S. at 755, 757. 
60. /d. at 755; Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 363 (4th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 504 U.S. 
753 (1992). 
61. Patterson, 504 U.S. at 755. 
62. /d. at 755-56. 
63. !d. at 759 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(J) (2006)). 
64. !d. at 764-65. The Court also rejected the need to consider the legislative history of 
the relevant bankruptcy provision, finding such analysis obviated by "the clarity of the 
statutory language at issue .... " /d. at 761. 
65. Patricia Dilley, Hidden in Plain View: The Pension Shield Against Creditors, 74 IND. 
L.J. 355, 387 (1999). 
66. /d. at 386-87. 
67. Patterson, 504 U.S. 753. 
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third parties.68 One scholar observed that by framing the decision on 
the Bankruptcy Code, the Court "inevitably precluded consideration 
of the underlying question of whether, and how best, to protect 
debtors from impoverishment in old age. "69 By focusing primarily on 
statutory language and eschewing any in-depth examination of 
ERISA's policies, the Court actually undermined the balance 
between protecting retirement assets and compensating innocent 
victims or creditors.70 The decision also averted scrutiny of the 
fundamental precept of why pension funds should be shielded from 
creditors at all. 71 
Over the next several years, the Court granted certiorari in two 
more cases to resolve continuing questions as to the reach of 
ERISA's anti-alienation rules. 72 Of the two decisions, the more 
recent is less controversial. In Kennedy v. Plan Adm 'r for DuPont · 
Sav. & Inv. Plan,73 a unanimous Court determined that ERISA's anti-
alienation provision did not "invalidate" a divorced spouse's non-
QDRO waiver of benefits under her ex-spouse's pension plan. 74 
Instead, because the plan specified the procedure by which the 
divorced spouse could waive entitlement to her ex-spouse's pension 
benefits, the plan administrator correctly disregarded the non-QDRO 
waiver as inconsistent with the plan documents. 75 In Boggs v. 
Boggs/6 the issue was whether ERISA preempted the testamentary 
transfer of a community property interest in an undistributed pension 
68. See In re Baker, 114 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing the "mysterious" 
provenance of the term "ERISA-qualified"). 
69. Dilley, supra note 65, at 385 (emphasis added). 
70. Sharon Reece, The Gilded Gates of Pension Protection: Amending the Anti-Alienation 
Provision of ERISA Section 206(d), 80 OR. L. REv. 379, 430-35 {2001). 
71. Dilley, supra note 65, at 387. 
72. See Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009); 
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997). The Supreme Court mentioned ERISA's anti-
alienation provision in two other post-Shumate opinions, but the provision was not 
part of the Court's analysis. In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rei. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 
(2001), the lower court included a discussion of anti-alienation under ERISA, but the 
Supreme Court focused its analysis on preemption and did not address assignment or 
alienation. Id at 145-46. In Raymond B. Yates, MD., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. 
Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004), the Court noted that the plan in question complied with 
the anti-alienation provisions of I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) and 29 U.S.C. § 1056{d)(l), but 
alienation was not a factor in the Court's determination that a business's working 
owner qualified under ERISA as a participant in a pension plan if the business 
employed at least one other person who was not the owner's spouse. Id at 8. 
73. 129 S. Ct. 865. 
74. !d. at 868. 
n. M , 
76. 520 U.S. 833 (1997). } 
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plan by the nonparticipant spouse.77 Isaac Boggs was employed by 
South Central Bell (Bell) from 1949 to 1985, during which time he 
participated in various Bell system retirement plans. 78 Isaac and his 
wife Dorothy were married during the entire period of his 
employment with Bell until Dorothy died in 1979.79 Dorothy 
bequeathed to Isaac the equivalent of a life estate in her community 
property interest in Isaac's pension benefits, with the remainder to the 
couple's three children.80 Isaac remarried within a year of Dorothy's 
death, worked for five more years, and died four years later. 81 Upon 
Isaac's death, his second wife contested Dorothy's attempted 
testamentary transfer of her community property interest in Isaac's 
pension benefits to Isaac and Dorothy's children, contending that 
Dorothy's putative bequest to the children was preempted by 
ERISA. 82 The district court and a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit 
upheld the transfer. 83 
In a controversial decision, 84 a divided Supreme Court reasoned 
that ERISA mandated uniformity of pension benefit treatment 
regardless of state property laws. 85 Although much of the majority 
opinion in Boggs dealt with ERISA's preemption of Louisiana 
common law,86 the Court buttressed its conclusions with a discussion 
of ERISA's anti-alienation provision.87 The Court noted that the 
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 amended ERISA's anti-alienation 
provisions to provide an exception for qualified domestic relations 
orders (QDROs).88 Because the statute created an exception to anti-
77. /d. at 835-36. 
78. /d. at 836. 
79. !d. 
80. /d. at 836-37. 
81. /d. at 836. 
82. !d. at 837. The retirement assets in controversy included an annuity of approximately 
$1,800 per month, 96 shares of AT&T stock from Bell's employee stock ownership 
plan (ESOP), and a lump-sum distribution of approximately $150,000 from Bell's 
Savings Plan for Salaried Employees that Isaac rolled over into an individual 
retirement account (IRA) upon his retirement from Bell. !d. at 836; id. at 856 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
83. !d. at 837-38. 
84. See Heather J. Rose, Comment, Boggs v. Boggs: Creating Real-Life Cinderellas, 33 J. 
MARSHALL L. REv. 271,271 (1999) (casting the second wife in the role ofthe wicked 
stepmother in a fairy tale). 
85. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 839-41. 
86. !d. at 841-44. 
87. /d. at 851-52. 
88. /d. at 843, 846-47. As discussed more fully below, a QDRO is a judgment or order 
that provides child support, alimony, or marital property rights, that has been issued 
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alienation for QDROs, the majority essentially applied the statutory 
construction maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 89 without 
characterizing it as such, to reach the conclusion that Congress 
intended to exclude all other formulations: 
The surviving spouse annuity and QDRO provisions, which 
acknowledge and protect specific pension plan community 
property interests, give rise to the strong implication that 
other community property claims are not consistent with the 
statutory scheme. ERISA's silence with respect to the right 
of a nonOparticipant spouse to control pension plan benefits 
by testamentary transfer provides powerful support for the 
conclusion that the right does not exist.90 
Although the majority opinion in Boggs avoided labeling the 
maxim, reliance on the doctrine's concept is at odds with the Court's 
less than favorable comments a decade earlier in a securities fraud 
case: 
We also reject application of the maxim of statutory 
construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius ... As we 
stated in SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-351, 64 S. 
Ct. 120, 123, 88 L. Ed. 88 (1943), such canons 'long have 
been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe 
the details of an act in conformity with its dominating 
general purpose' ... We believe the maxim cannot properly 
be applied to a situation where the remedies redress 
different misconduct and where the remedial purposes of the 
Acts would be undermined by a presumption of 
exclusivity. 91 
pursuant to a state's domestic relations laws, and that meets specific statutory 
requirements set forth in I.R.C. § 414(p) and 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3). Id 
89. See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 357 (1988) ("[T]he expression 
of one is the exclusion of others .... "). 
90. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 847-48. 
91. Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.23 (1983) (citations 
omitted); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 
282 (1985) ("The canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius is ... based on the 
assumption of legislative omniscience, because it would make sense only if all 
omissions in legislative drafting were deliberate. Although this canon seemed dead 
for a while, it has been resurrected by the Supreme Court to provide a basis for 
refusing to create private remedies for certain statutory violations. Its recent 
disparagement by a unanimous Court [in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston] puts its 
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The majority in Boggs likely would contend that it construed 
ERISA's anti-alienation provisions in conformity with ERISA's 
general purpose of protecting pension accounts. The dissent and 
some commentators would disagree.92 
In a dissent joined fully by Justice O'Connor and in part by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer pointed out 
the inequity of the Court's decision.93 If Dorothy had divorced Isaac 
shortly before her death and obtained a QDRO, the terms of her will 
would have been honored and the couple's children would have 
received their mother's interest in Isaac's pension upon Isaac's 
death.94 
The dissent also explained in detail why ERISA's anti-alienation 
provisions did not mandate the result reached by the majority. 95 First, 
ERISA only barred assignment or alienation of pension benefits. 96 
Dorothy obtained her ownership interest in Isaac's pension through 
Louisiana's community property laws, not through assignment or 
alienation. 97 Second, because Dorothy and Isaac owned the 
retirement assets equally as community property, Dorothy had as 
much right as Isaac to direct the disposition of her property at her 
death.98 ERISA had no effect on what a pension fund beneficiary did 
with the pension funds after death "for after the death of a beneficiary 
the money is no longer needed for that beneficiary's support."99 
Third, the dissent addressed the conclusion that when Congress 
amended ERISA to exempt QDROs from the bar against alienation, it 
rendered all other orders ineffectual. 100 By its terms, the QDRO 
future in some doubt but more likely confirms that judicial use of canons of 
construction is opportunistic."). 
92. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 855 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Cynthia A. Samuel & 
Katherine S. Spaht, Fixing What's Broke: Amending ERISA to Allow Community 
Property to Apply Upon the Death of a Participant's Spouse, 35 F AM. L.Q. 425, 426-
27 (2001); Erica S. Phillips, Comment, Equality in Life, Inequality in Death: The 
Ramifications of the United States Supreme Court Decision in Boggs v. Boggs, 34 
IDAHO L. REv. 623, 625 (1998); Tony Vecino, Note, Boggs v. Boggs: State 
Community Property and Succession Rights Wallow in ERISA 's Mire, 28 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REv. 571,599 (1998). 
93. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 854-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
94. ld. at 868. 
95. ld. at 863-68. 
96. 29 u.s.c. § 1056(d)(J) (2006). 
97. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 864 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
98. ld. at 865. Under Louisiana law, even though Dorothy predeceased Isaac, any 
testamentary transfer would take effect only following an accounting after Isaac's 
death. See id. 
99. !d. at 864-65. 
100. See id. at 866-67. 
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amendment was concerned only with the treatment of domestic 
relations orders that were "qualified" under the terms provided in the 
statute. 101 Congress gave no indication that its amendment would 
affect other orders, such as those entered in probate, that did not 
assign or alienate pension benefits. 102 
As might be expected, the exclusion of equity from statutory 
applications sometimes produces inequitable results. The strict 
reading mandated by the Supreme Court has not produced 
predictability, but instead has produced results that even the Court 
has recognized as "distaste[ful]."103 
III. EXAMINING NONCONTROVERSIAL ANTI-ALIENATION 
EXCEPTIONS 
A. Exceptions to Anti-Alienation Specifically Within the Spendthrift 
Provisions-Borrowing an Egg 
When Congress enacted ERISA, the statute included two 
exceptions to the prohibition on alienation: (1) a participant or 
beneficiary could borrow against her accrued non-forfeitable 
benefit, 104 and (2) a pension recipient could voluntarily assign up to 
ten percent of a benefit payment, as long as the assignment was 
revocable and not made to defray plan administration costs. 105 The 
limited legislative history supporting the voluntary revocable 
assignment and loan exceptions provides that: 
Under the conference substitute, a plan must provide that 
benefits under the plan may not be assigned or alienated. 
However, the plan may provide that after a benefit is in pay 
status, there may be a voluntary revocable assignment (not 
to exceed 10 percent of any benefit payment) by an 
employee which is not for purposes of defraying the 
administrative costs of the plan. For purposes of this rule, a 
garnishment or levy is not to be considered a voluntary 
assignment. Vested benefits may be used as collateral for 
101. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 866--67 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
102. See id. at 867. 
103. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'! Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 377 (1990). 
104. I.R.C. § 40l(a)(l3)(A) (2006); see also Treas. Reg.§ 1.40l(a)-13(d)(2) (as amended 
in 1988). 
105. I.R.C. § 40l(a)(l3)(A); see also Treas. Reg.§ 1.40l(a)-13(d)(l). 
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reasonable loans from a plan, where the fiduciary 
requirements ofthe law are not violated. 106 
79 
Over the next two decades, Congress supplemented these two 
exceptions with ERISA amendments that provide exceptions for 
orders entered in domestic relations actions 107 and judgments based 
on breach of fiduciary duty as to pension plans. 108 
1. Participant Loans-Fashionable, Glittering Eggs 109 
Within a few years of ERISA's initial enactment, which included 
an anti-alienation exception for loans made to plan participants, 
Congress became concerned that widespread use of such loans could 
adversely affect retirement savings. 110 Balanced against this concern 
was the recognition that a blanket prohibition against loans might 
deter non-highly compensated employees from participating in 
retirement savings programs. 111 As originally enacted, ERISA 
required that plan loans state a reasonable interest rate, be adequately 
secured, establish a sound repayment schedule, and be available in a 
manner not discriminating against rank-and-file workers.112 These 
requirements have been and continue to be augmented by other 
limitations such as the rule stating that the amounts received from a 
pension plan as a loan will be taxed as a distribution unless the 
conditions in I.R.C. § 72(p) and the applicable regulations are met. 113 
With the addition of§ 72(p) through the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Congress created a 
presumption that plan loans constituted taxable distributions unless 
the loan met specific requirements relating to loan balance114 and 
106. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 280 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5038, 5061. 
107. l.R.C. § 40l(a)(l3)(B). 
108. l.R.C. § 40l(a)(l3)(C); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4) (2006). 
109. See F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 22 (Eleanor Lanahan et al. eds., 
Scribner 1992) ( 1925) ("Across the courtesy bay the white palaces of fashionable East 
Egg glittered along the water .... "). 
110. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF 
THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, H.R. Doc. No. 97-4961, 
at 294-95 (1982). 
Ill. !d. 
112. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(l) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.40l(a)(4)-4(a), -4(e)(l)(i), -
4(e)(3)(iii)(A) (as amended in 1988). 
113. See I.R.C. § 72(p) (2006); Treas. Reg.§ 1.72(p)-l (2009); see also I.R.C. § 4975(d)(l) 
(2006) (providing an exception to the prohibited transaction rules for participant 
loans). 
114. l.R.C. § 72(p)(2)(A), (D). 
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repayment terms. 115 Labor and Treasury Regulations further refmed 
and clarified areas such as maximum loan amounts 116 and loan 
agreement formalities. 117 Failure to comply with the statutory and 
regulatory mandates in either form or operation may result in a 
deemed distribution of the full loan balance, including accrued 
interest. 118 In addition to a tax on the distribution, the plan participant 
risks an additional ten percent early distribution tax. 119 Despite the 
stringent rules and possible tax implications for pension plan loans, 
allowing a participant to borrow against these funds provides 
significant flexibility and control over plan benefits prior to 
retirement. 
2. Ten Percent Limit on Alienation of Benefits in Pay Status-
Keeping Most of the Eggs in the Baskee20 
As part of ERISA's original framework, Congress included a cap 
on the amount of benefits in pay status that may be alienated. 121 
Section 401(a)(13)(A) allows participants receiving benefits to assign 
up to ten percent of their benefit payment if the assignment is 
voluntary, revocable, and not used for plan administration costs. 122 If 
strictly applied, this requirement seems somewhat paternalistic and 
formal-once a participant is receiving benefits, it is difficult to 
justify the government's interest in how the money is spent, let alone 
its enforcement of such restrictions. One author posits that Congress 
possibly intended this to be a protection "in perpetuity'' that gives 
some latitude to the pension recipient "while restricting the pensioner 
and other possible third party claimants from pouncing on the 
payments at a time when the retiree needs [them] most."123 Several 
115. I.R.C. § 72(p)(2)(B)-{C). 
116. See 29 C.P.R.§ 2550.408b-1(c)(1)-(3), (f) (2008). 
117. Treas. Reg.§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A (3)(b). 
118. Treas. Reg.§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A (3), (10)(b), (11)(a), (14), (15). 
119. I.R.C. § 72(t)(1). I.R.C. § 72(m) imposes an additional tax for certain key employees 
who are "5-percent owner[s]" of the business, as defined in I.R.C. § 416(i)(1)(B)(i). 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A (11). 
120. See MARK TWAIN, THE TRAGEDY OF PUDD'NHEAD WILSON 197 (1894) available at 
http://etext.lib. virginia.edu/railton/wilson/facsimile/twapu197.jpg ("Behold, the fool 
saith, 'Put not all thine eggs in the one basket'-which is but a manner of saying, 
'Scatter your money and attention;' but the wise man saith, 'Put all your eggs in the 
one basket and-WATCH THAT BASKET.'"). 
121. ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 206(d), 88 Stat. 829, 864-65 (1974); 29 U.S.C. § 
1506(d)(2) (2006); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A) (2006). 
122. I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1506(d)(2). 
123. Reece, supra note 70, at 392. 
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courts have interpreted the provisions as a prohibition only on the 
alienation ofundistributed funds. 124 
3. Qualified Domestic Relations Orders-Tending the Egg125 
In its original form, ERISA provided no anti-alienation exception 
for orders awarding child support or alimony payments. Although 
many courts fashioned exceptions for domestic relations orders, 126 
under a strict reading of the statute such orders constituted an 
attempted assignment or alienation of pension benefits contrary to 
and preempted by ERISA. 127 Ten years after ERISA's enactment, 
Congress added an exception for orders entered in domestic relations 
actions128 based on its observation that the interpretive case law 
revealed a lack ofuniformity: 
Generally, under present law, benefits under a pens10n, 
profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan (pension plan) are 
subject to prohibitions against assignment or alienation 
(spendthrift provisions.) Under present law, certain 
provisions of ERISA supersede (preempt) State laws 
relating to pension, etc., plans. A plan that does not include 
these required spendthrift provisions is not a qualified plan 
under the Code, and State law permitting such an 
assignment or alienation is generally preempted by ERISA. 
Several cases have arisen in which courts have been 
required to determine whether the ERISA preemption and 
spendthrift provisions apply to family support obligations 
(e.g., alimony, separate maintenance, and child support 
124. See Hoult v. Hoult, 373 F.3d 47, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2004); Robbins v. DeBuono, 218 
F.3d 197, 203-04 (2d Cir. 2000); Central States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. 
Howell, 227 F.3d 672, 678-79 (6th Cir. 2000); Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 
919-21 (9th Cir. 2000); Trucking Employees of N.J. Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Colville, 
16 F.3d 52, 54-56 (3d Cir. 1994). But see United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681, 682-
84 (4th Cir. 1995). 
125. See DR. SEUSS, HORTON HATCHES THE EGG 22 (1940) ("No matter WHAT happens, 
This egg must be tended!"). 
126. See, e.g., Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1979). 
127. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 460-61 (6th Cir. 1980) (comparing 
decisions that differed in their conclusions as to whether ERlSA's anti-alienation 
provision preempted garnishment or attachment in situations including family support 
obligations). 
128. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (2006); see also I.R.C. § 414(p)(l)(B)(i) (2006). The term 
"domestic relations order" encompasses formal court approval of property settlement 
agreements. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii). 
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obligations). In some of these cases, the courts have held 
that ERISA was not intended to preempt State domestic 
relations law permitting the attachment of vested benefits 
for the purpose of meeting these obligations. Some courts 
have held that the ERISA preemption provision does not 
prevent application of State law permitting attachment of 
nonvested benefits for the purpose of meeting family 
support obligations. There is a divergence of opinion 
among the courts as to whether ERISA preempts State 
community property laws insofar as they relate to the rights 
of a married couple to benefits under a pension, etc., plan. 129 
In rectifying the dilemma created by the courts' diverging opinions, 
the Senate Finance Committee recognized the importance of 
"establish[ing] guidelines for determining whether the exception to 
the spendthrift rules applies," and indicated that the QDRO 
amendment was "necessary to ensure that only those orders that are 
excepted from the spendthrift provisions are not preempted by 
ERISA."130 
Against this backdrop, Congress created detailed criteria that must 
be met for a QDRO to escape ERISA's prohibition on alienation or 
assignment. 131 A threshold determination entails a characterization of 
five aspects of the order: ( 1) type-whether it is a judgment, decree, 
or order;132 (2) subject--concerning child support, alimony, or martial 
property rights; 133 (3) parties-spouses, former spouses, children, or 
other dependents; 134 (4) legal basis-issued under a state's domestic 
relations law; 135 and (5) effect--creating, recognizing, or assigning 
pension benefit rights to an alternate payee. 136 By satisfying the 
preceding five criteria, a legal document is considered a "domestic 
relations order."137 To become a qualified domestic relations order, 
ERISA requires inclusion of specific information such as the 
identities and mailing addresses of the plan participant and each 
129. S. REP. No. 98-575, at 18-19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2564-65 
(citation omitted). 
130. ld. at 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2565. 
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1 056(3)(A)-(E). 
132. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(B) (2006). 
133. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I); I.R.C. § 414(p)(1)(B)(i). 
134. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I); I.R.C. § 414(p)(1)(B)(i). 
135. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II); I.R.C. § 414(p)(1)(B)(ii). 
136. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I); I.R.C. § 414(p)(1)(A)(i). 
137. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i); I.R.C. § 414(p)(1)(B). 
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alternate payee whose rights are affected by the order; 138 the amount, 
percentage, or method for determining the benefits to be paid to each 
alternate payee; 139 the period or number of payments covered; 140 and 
identification of the plans affected. 141 Moreover, the order will not be 
qualified if it modifies the type, form, or amount of an alternate 
payee's benefits in a manner inconsistent with the plan or, in certain 
respects, with a previous QDR0. 142 
Despite the apparent rigidity of the statutory text for QDROs, in 
practice the requirements have become somewhat malleable. 
ERISA's anti-alienation provisions apply to pension benefits, but not 
welfare benefits. 143 A QDRO is an exception to ERISA's anti-
alienation provisions and therefore should be limited in applicability 
to pension benefits. Several courts have expanded the anti-alienation 
requirements to include welfare benefits in domestic relations cases, 
typically where life insurance is concerned. 144 Other courts have 
gone so far as to dispense with strict compliance with the statutory 
QDRO requirements. 145 Recently, a district court treated a restraining 
order as a QDRO, while acknowledging that the order "fail[ed] to 
meet every one of[the statutory] requirements."146 
138. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(i); I.R.C. § 414(p)(2)(A). 
139. 29 U.S. C.§ 1056(d)(3)(C)(ii); I.R.C. § 414(p)(2)(B). 
140. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(iii); I.R.C. § 414(p)(2)(C). 
141. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(iv); I.R.C. § 414(p)(2)(D). 
142. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D); I.R.C. § 414(p)(3). The Pension Protection Act of 2006 
directed the Secretary of Labor to promulgate regulations clarifying, among other 
things, circumstances in which a domestic relations order could be considered a 
QDRO even though it is issued after or revises another QDRO. Pension Protection 
Act of2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280 § 1001, 120 Stat. 780, 1052-53 (2006) (codified at 
29 C.F.R. § 2530.206 (2008)). 
143. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(l) (stating that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that 
benefits under the plan may not be assigned or alienated") (emphasis added). 
ERISA's framework distinguishes between two types of benefits: (l) "pension," 
which pertains to retirement income, and (2) "welfare," which relates to items such as 
health insurance, vacation benefits, training, day care, scholarship funds, and prepaid 
legal services. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006), with 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) 
(2006). 
144. See, e.g., Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Howell, 227 F.3d 672, 678-
79 (6th Cir. 2000); Carland v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 1114, 1119 (lOth Cir. 
1991). 
145. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 119 F.3d 415,422 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
substantial compliance with ERISA's QDRO requirements is sufficient); Metro. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d l 080, I 085 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[i]t is asking 
too much of domestic relations lawyers and judges to expect them to dot every i and 
cross every tin formulating divorce decrees that have ERISA implications"). 
146. Unicare Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Phanor, 472 F. Supp. 2d 8, 12 (D. Mass. 2007). 
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4. Fiduciary Breach ofTrust-Faithless Egg-Sitters147 
Seven years after the Supreme Court's decision in Guidry, 148 the 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 added an anti-alienation exception to 
ERISA for claims against a pension plan based on breach of a 
fiduciary duty owed to the plan. 149 Recognizing that "[c]ourts have 
been divided in their interpretation of the prohibition on assignment 
or alienation" in situations where a pension plan suffered from a 
participant's criminal conduct or breach of fiduciary duty, Congress 
amended ERISA to allow an offset against the participant's plan 
benefits. 150 The amendment permits reimbursement of a plan from a 
participant's pension benefits only upon conviction of a crime 
involving the plan, 151 a civil judgment for breach of ERISA's 
fiduciary provisions, 152 or settlement between the participant and the 
I47. See DR. SEUss, supra note I25, at 4 ('"Very well,' said the elephant, 'since you insist 
.... You want a vacation. Go fly off and take it. I'll sit on your egg and I'll try not 
to break it. I'll stay and be faithful. I mean what I say.' 'Toodle-oo!' sang out 
Mayzie and fluttered away."). · 
I48. See discussion supra Part II. C. In Guidry, the Court noted that although the convicted 
union official embezzled union funds, he "has not been found to have breached any 
fiduciary duty to the pension plans." 493 U.S. at 373. Accordingly, the Court did not 
reach the question of whether a fiduciary's personal liability for plan losses that 
resulted from his breach constituted an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation 
provisions that would allow recovery from the fiduciary's own plan benefits. Jd at 
372-73 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006) (relating to fiduciary personal 
liability) and 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(l) (2006) (regarding anti-alienation)). 
149. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. I 05-34, § 1502, Ill Stat. 788, I 058-61; 
I.R.C. § 40I(a)(I3)(C)(i) (2005); 29 U.S.C. § 1506(d)(4)(A)-(B) (2006). 
I50. H.R. REP. No. 105-220, at 756-57 (1997) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that "[s]ome courts 
have ruled that there is no exception in ERISA for the offset of a participant's benefit 
to make a plan whole in the case of a fiduciary breach," while "[o]ther courts have 
reached a different result and permitted an offset of a participant's benefit for breach 
of fiduciary duties"). 
I 51. 29 U.S.C. § I056(d)(4)(A)(i); I.R.C. § 40l(a)(I3)(C)(i)(I) (2005). 
I52. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4)(A)(ii); I.R.C. § 40l(a)(I3)(C)(i)(II). The statute technically 
might allow alienation of plan benefits even if the judgment is not based on a breach 
of fiduciary obligations to a plan. As written, the civil judgment provision merely 
requires that the judgment be "entered by a court in an action brought in connection 
with a violation (or alleged violation) of part 4 of subtitle B of title I of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of I974 [(i.e., the fiduciary provisions of ERISA title 
1)]." I.R.C. § 40l(a)(l3)(C)(i)(II) (emphasis added). Thus, if a multi-count complaint 
is brought against a plan fiduciary, but the ERISA count is dismissed or otherwise 
fails to form the basis for the defendant's liability, the mere fact that the action was 
brought "in connection with ... [an] alleged violation" of ERISA's fiduciary 
provisions arguably would support an offset against the fiduciary's own plan benefits. 
The language in the Conference Committee report would restrict any offset by 
requiring that "the participant's benefit in the plan be applied to satisfy the liability." 
H.R. REP. No. 105-220, at 757 (I997) (Con£ Rep.) (emphasis added). The actual 
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Secretary of Labor or the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation for 
the participant's breach of fiduciary responsibilities regarding the 
plan. 153 The judgment, order, or settlement document must specify 
that the offset is to be paid from the participant's plan benefits. 154 
Additionally, the interests of a participant's spouse will only be 
affected under the detailed circumstances described in the statute. 155 
B. Exceptions to Anti-Alienation Not Specifically Within the Anti-
Alienation Provisions-Garnishment and "Bedeviled" Eggs 
1. Federal tax liens 
Failure to pay federal taxes results in a federal tax lien156 and gives 
the government the right to levy on the delinquent taxpayer's 
property and property rights. 157 Although I.R.C. § 6334 exempts 
specific property from levy, pension plan funds are not one of the 
enumerated iterns. 158 Also, ERISA directs that "[n]othing in this 
subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, 
impair, or supersede any law of the United States .... "159 Along 
wording of the statute, however, is not similarly restrictive, requiring only that "the 
judgment, order, decree, or settlement agreement expressly provide[d] for the offset of 
all or part of the amount ordered or required to be paid to the plan against the 
participant's benefits provided under the plan .... " 29 U.S. C. § 1056(d)(4)(B); I.R.C. 
§ 40l(a)(13)(C)(ii). 
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4)(A)(iii); I.R.C. § 40l(a)(13)(C)(i)(III). 
154. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4)(B); LR.C. § 401(a)(13)(C)(ii). 
155. See ·29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4)(C) and I.R.C. § 40l(a)(13)(C)(iii) (directing that where 
survivor annuity requirements are present, attaching a nonparticipant spouse's interest 
requires written consent, an effective waiver, or the specific inclusion of the 
nonparticipant spouse's interest in the judgment, order, decree, or settlement). 
156. I.R.C. § 6321 (2006) ("If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay 
the same after demand, the amount ... shall be a lien in favor of the United States 
upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such 
person."). 
157. I.R.C. § 6331(a) (2006) ("If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay 
the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary 
to collect such tax ... by levy upon all property and rights to property (except such 
property as is exempt under section 6334) belonging to such person or on which there 
is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax."). 
158. See I.R.C. § 6334(a)(l)-(7) (2006) (exempting property such as apparel, school 
books, undelivered mail, and benefits for unemployment or workers' compensation, 
as well as limited amounts of fuel, provisions, furniture, and books or tools needed for 
the taxpayer's trade, business, or profession). While § 6334(a)(6) exempts a narrow 
class of certain pension and annuity payments, ERISA-based pension benefits do not 
fall within the exemption. 
159. 29 u.s.c. § 1144(d) (2006). 
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with the language in the Code and ERISA, the Federal Debt 
Collection Procedure Act (FDCPA) supports collection of debts owed 
to the United States through "garnishment against property (including 
nonexempt disposable earnings) in which the debtor has a substantial 
nonexempt interest and which is in the possession, custody, or control 
of a person other than the debtor, in order to satisfy the judgment 
against the debtor."160 The FDCPA's broad defmition of property 
includes present and future interests, either legal or equitable, held in 
any manner, and expressly embraces "spendthrift and pension 
trusts. "161 
Numerous courts have considered the question of whether ERISA's 
anti-alienation language precludes enforcement of a federal tax lien 
against undistributed pension funds. 162 It is generally accepted that 
ERISA does not hinder the government's rights to levy against a 
delinquent taxpayer's interest in her pension benefits. 163 Not 
surprisingly, the IRS agrees that tax liens in favor of the United 
States are not subject to ERISA's anti-alienation provision. 164 The 
Service also takes the position that ERISA plans may be garnished to 
satisfy federal criminal fines. 165 
2. Bankruptcy 
Although a detailed examination of the interplay between ERISA 
and bankruptcy laws is beyond the scope of this article, many of the 
complexities and uncertainties that thrived following Patterson v. 
Shumate166 persisted for several years. One bankruptcy judge 
observed that "disputes over how to construe Shumate have bedeviled 
160. 28 U.S.C. § 3205(a) (2006). 
161. 28 U.S.C. § 3002(12) (2006). 
162. See Mcintyre v. United States, 222 F.3d 655, 657, 660 (9th Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Sawaf, 74 F.3d 119, 120 (6th Cir. 1996); Shanbaum v. United States 32 F.3d 180, 
183 (5th Cir. 1994); Ameritrust Co. v. Derakhshan, 830 F. Supp. 406, 409-10 (N.D. 
Ohio 1993). 
163. See Mcintyre, 222 F.3d at 660; Sawaf, 74 F.3d at 122-25; Shanbaum, 32 F.3d at 183; 
see also Lawler v. Suntrust Sec. Inc., 740 So. 2d 592, 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) 
(commenting in a suit by an IRA owner against her financial institution for releasing 
IRA funds to the IRS pursuant to levy, that "(t]he IRS has a well-grounded reputation 
for being the King Kong of creditors in terms of its powers to collect tax 
delinquencies."). 
164. Treas. Reg.§ 1.40l(a)-13(b)(2) (as amended in 1988). 
165. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200426027 (Mar. 30, 2004) (citing United States v. Tyson, 265 
F. Supp. 2d 788 (E.D. Mich. 2003); United States v. Clark, No. 02-X-74872, 2003 
WL 22889389 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 2003); United States v. Rice, 196 F. Supp. 2d 
1196, 1201 (N.D. Okla. 2002); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200342007 (July 23, 2003). 
166. 504 U.S. 753 (1992). 
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later cases and limited the force of the policies [relating to the 
protection of pension benefits]. " 167 
In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (BAPCP A) 168 included an amendment to Bankruptcy 
Code § 522 that exempted "retirement funds" from bankruptcy court 
claims if the funds or accounts were exempt from taxation. 169 That 
Congress chose to solidify the link between alienation and tax exempt 
status still begs the question of whether ''the fundamental principles 
governing tax treatment of deferred compensation [are] consistent 
with or even relevant to the appropriate treatment of deferred 
compensation in bankruptcy."170 
IV. PURSUING RECOVERY FROM A CRIMINAL'S PENSION 
BENEFITS-NOT ALL EGGS KEEP LONGER IN THE 
COOLER 
Recent cases have focused attention on convicted criminals' 
interests in pension plan assets. In one decision, a state government 
attempted to recoup its incarceration expenses from prisoners' 
undistributed pension funds. 171 In other cases, the federal 
government has sought to invade a criminal's pension plan to provide 
restitution to the offender's victims. 172 
The controversy in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cax173 involved 
several Michigan laws that required pension plans to send a 
prisoner's benefit payments to the inmate's prison account, from 
which the state had authority to take ninety percent of the funds to 
defray the costs of incarceration. 174 The relevant Michigan statutes, 
known as the State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act 
(SCFRA), gave the state's attorney general authority to file a 
complaint in state court for reimbursement from a prisoner's assets 
167. In re Handel, 301 B.R. 421,430-31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
168. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
169. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C), (d)(l2) (2006) (listing I.R.C. §§ 401 (qualified pension, 
profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans), 403 (taxation of employee annuities), 408 
(IR.As), 408A (Roth IR.As), 414 (defmitions and special rules), 457 (deferred 
compensation plans of state and local governments and tax-exempt organizations), 
and 50l(a) (tax exemption for qualified retirement plan trusts) (2005)). 
170. Dilley, supra note 65, at 401. 
171. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cox, 447 F.3d 967, 969-70 (6th Cir. 2006). 
172. United States v. Novak, 441 F.3d 819, 820 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, United States v. 
Novak, 476 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (en bane); United States v. Miller, 588 F. Supp. 
2d 789, 791 (W.D. Mich. 2008). 
173. Cox, 447 F.3d at 967. 
174. I d. at 968-69. 
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for up to ninety percent of the state's "cost of care."175 Under 
SCFRA, "[a]ssets" included "property, tangible or intangible, real or 
personal, belonging to or due a prisoner or former prisoner including 
income or payments to such prisoner from social security, ... 
pension benefits, ... annuities, retirement benefits, or from any other 
source whatsoever .... "176 
The state recognized that ERISA's anti-alienation language 
prohibited the state court from ordering the pension plan to send 
prisoners' pension funds directly to the state. 177 Instead, the state 
court ordered four prisoners with pension assets to direct their 
pension plans to forward payments to the inmates' prison accounts. 178 
Because the Michigan Department of Corrections restricted prisoners 
from having any bank accounts other than a prison account, funds 
transferred to a prison account could then be redirected by the prison 
warden to the Michigan treasury. 179 When three inmates refused to 
notify DaimlerChrysler to forward their pension benefit payments to 
the prison for deposit in the prison accounts, the attorney general 
advised DaimlerChrysler to send the pension checks to the prisoners 
at their prison addresses. 180 DaimlerChrysler did not comply with the 
state's notices, but instead sought a declaratory judgment in federal 
district court as to its obligations regarding the state's attempted 
diversion ofthe prisoners' pension funds. 181 
The district court determined that the state court's orders and the 
state's notices were rendered invalid by ERISA's anti-alienation 
provision. 182 On review, the appeals court affirmed the district 
court's judgment, concluding that delivery of the pension funds to the 
prisoners' institutional addresses was "a mere formalism . . . not 
dispositive of whether an alienation ha[d] occurred."183 The court 
noted that its ruling did not bar Michigan's right to reimbursement; 
175. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 800.403(3), .404(1) (West 1998); Cox, 447 F.3d at 968-
69. 
176. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.40l(a) (West 1998). 
177. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 7, Cox v. DaimlerChrysler, 127 S. Ct. 2971 
(2006) (No. 06-273). 
178. Cox, 447 F.3d at 968-69. 
I 79. !d. at 969-70. 
180. !d. at 970. 
181. /d. at 970, 975. DaimlerChrysler argued that the Michigan laws were preempted by 
ERISA's anti-alienation provision, as well as the general preemption provision 
contained in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Id at 972. 
182. Id at 971. 
183. Id at 975-76. 
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the state remained free to proceed against pension funds after the 
prisoners received them. 184 
Although Cox prevented a state court from encumbering 
undistributed pension plan funds, 185 the federal government has fared 
better in its attempts to garnish pension accounts. In addition to the 
federal government's rights to reach plan assets to satisfy fmes and 
tax liens, 186 courts generally have interpreted the Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act (MYRA) as an exception to ERISA's ban on 
assignment and alienation. 187 The recent en bane decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States 
v. Novak188 illustrates the arguments for and against applying MYRA 
to enforce restitution orders against pension plan benefits. 189 
Raymond Novak worked as director of telecommunications for 
Robinsons-May Department Stores (May Company) from 1990 to 
2000, during which time he participated in May Company's 
retirement and profit sharing plans. 190 Novak's then-wife, Norma 
Ortega Nance, worked for Nestle U.S.A., Inc. (Nestle), in a position 
where her duties involved access to telephone equipment. 191 Over a 
four-year period, the couple engaged in a scheme whereby Norma 
ordered $3.3 million worth of telephone boards for Nestle and passed 
them on to her husband, who then sold the equipment and pocketed 
the proceeds. 192 Novak pleaded guilty to conspiracy to transport 
stolen goods 193 and filing a false tax return, 194 was sentenced to 24 
months in prison, and was ordered to pay restitution of over $3.3 
184. !d. at 976. Concluding that ERISA's anti-alienation provision prohibited SCFRA's 
garnishment procedures, the Sixth Circuit declined to reach the question of whether 
the Michigan statute also was barred by ERISA's general preemption provision, 29 
U.S.C. § 1144(a). Id 
185. Id 
186. See discussion supra Part III.B.l. 
187. See United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Himebaugh, No. 02-CR-0077-022-CVE, 2007 WL 1462430, at *2 (N.D. Okla. May 
17, 2007); United States v. First Bank & Trust E. Tex., 477 F. Supp. 2d 777, 780-81 
(E.D. Tex. 2007); United States v. Wahlen, 459 F. Supp. 2d 800, 822 (E.D. Wis. 
2006); United States v. Lazorwitz, 411 F. Supp. 2d 634, 636-37 (E.D.N.C. 2005); 
United States v. James, 312 F. Supp. 2d 802, 805 (E.D. Va. 2004); In re True, 340 
B.R. 597, 602 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006). 
188. 476 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). 
189. Id at 1043. 
190. United States v. Novak, 441 F.3d 819, 820 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 476 F.3d 1041 
(9th Cir. 2007) (en bane). 
191. Novak, 476 F.3d at 1043. 
192. Id 
193. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006). 
194. I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2006). 
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million. 195 The restitution order in Novak was premised on the 
MYRA, which provides in part: 
Civil remedies for satisfaction of an unpaid fme 
(a) ENFORCEMENT.-The United States may enforce a 
judgment imposing a fme in accordance with the practices 
and procedures for the enforcement of a civil judgment 
under Federal law or State law. Notwithstanding any other 
Federal law (including section 207 of the Social Security 
Act), a judgment imposing a fme may be enforced against 
all property or rights to property of the person fmed, except 
that-
(1) property exempt from levy for taxes pursuant to section 
6334(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (10), and (12) ofthe 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall be exempt from 
enforcement ofthe judgment under Federal law; 
(2) section 3014 of chapter 176 of title 28 shall not apply to 
enforcement under Federal law; and 
(3) the provisions of section 303 of the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1673) shall apply to enforcement 
of the judgment under Federal law or State law. 196 
Novak opposed the government's efforts to garnish his pension 
funds, relying on ERISA's anti-alienation provision. 197 
The district court quashed the writ of garnishment and the 
government appealed. 198 Following reversal by a divided panel of the 
Ninth Circuit, 199 the appellate court concluded in a divided en bane 
opinion that the MYRA reflected a congressional intent of allowing 
alienation of ERISA-covered retirement funds to satisfy MYRA-
based criminal restitution orders.Z00 In balancing MYRA's statutory 
purpose ofholding offenders accountable to compensate their victims 
195. Novak, 476 F.3d at 1043. 
196. 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (2006). 
197. Novak,476F.3dat 1044. 
198. !d. 
199. !d. 
200. /d. at 1044, 1047-49. 
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in an amount that reflects the impact of the criminal activity01 with 
the Supreme Court's conclusion that ERISA required holding 
retirement funds "inviolate" until retirement/02 the court engaged in a 
detailed discussion of these two competing provisions. 203 
The court began its opinion with a nod to the competing policies 
underlying MYRA and ERISA: the "MYRA rests on the recognition 
that '[i]t is essential that the criminal justice system recognize the 
impact that crime has on the victim, and, to the extent possible, 
ensure that [the] offender be held accountable to repay these 
costs. "'204 On the other hand, "ERISA is meant to assure that 
'[r]etirement funds shall remain inviolate until retirement."'205 Other 
than a quotation from the Supreme Court's decision in Guidry206 that 
ERISA "[s]ection 206(d) reflects a considered congressional policy 
choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners ... 
and their dependents ... ,"207 the majority continued for 20 more 
pages without analyzing or even mentioning the divergent policies at 
the crux of the case. 
One aspect of apparent significance to the majority's analysis 
involved the use of the word "notwithstanding" in the MYRA's 
enforcement provision: 
The United States may enforce a judgment imposing a fme 
in accordance with the practices and procedures for the 
enforcement of a civil judgment under Federal law or State 
law. Notwithstanding any other Federal law (including 
section 207 of the Social Security Act), a judgment imposing 
a fine may be enforced against all property or rights to 
property of the person fmed, except that- (1) property 
exempt from [tax levies under specified I.R.C. provisions] 
shall be exempt [from MYRA]; (2) [FDCP A exemption 
procedures shall be inapplicable]; and (3) ... Consumer 
Credit Protection Act [provisions limiting disposable 
201. S. REP. No. 104-179, at 18 (1995). 
202. Novak, 476 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 851 (1997) (quoting 
JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 547 
(2d ed. 1995))). 
203. See id. at 1043. 
204. I d. (quoting S. REP. No. 104-179, at 18 (1995)). 
205. ld. at 1043 (quoting Boggs, 520 U.S. at 851 (quoting JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A 
WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 547 (2d ed. 1995))) (internal quotation 
mark omitted). 
206. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'I Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365,376 (1990). 
207. Novak, 476 F.3d at 1045-46 (quoting Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376). 
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earnings garnishment] shall apply to enforcement of the 
judgment under Federal law or State law. 208 
By using the term "notwithstanding," the majority determined that 
Congress swept away all conflicting laws, including ERISA's anti-
alienation provision, insofar as such laws were at odds with the 
MVRA.2o9 
In a brief consideration of the background leading up to the 
enactment of the MVRA, the court noted Senator John McCain's 
concern that the version of the MYRA bill under consideration did 
not include an amendment to ERISA that would permit garnishing 
pension plans to provide restitution to victims of crimes.210 The 
conclusion drawn by the majority, however, was that Senator 
McCain's concern, together with Judiciary Committee Chairman 
Orrin Hatch's response that the committee would consider his points, 
indicated that the MYRA's "notwithstanding" phrase was meant to 
establish the MVRA as an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation 
provision.211 With the exception of a short look at some of the 
MYRA's legislative history,212 the majority opinion primarily parsed 
the language of the conflicting statutes with very limited examination 
of the underlying policies and purposes. The opinion did recognize 
that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence forbade the judicial creation 
of implied exceptions to ERISA's prohibition on alienation or 
assignment of pension benefits.213 However, by construing the 
MVRA as an express exception to ERISA's alienation language,214 
the court side-stepped the need to explain why the MYRA's policy of 
compensating victims should take precedence over ERISA's policy 
of safeguarding pension benefits. 
The Novak dissent chastised the majority for trying to resolve 
ambiguities in the MYRA when the court's limited role should have 
been deciding whether the MYRA "evinces an unmistakable 
intention to override ERISA's anti-alienation provision."215 With 
regard to legislative history, the dissent did not view Senator 
McCain's concerns with creating a crime victim restitution exception 
to ERISA as support for the theory that the MYRA's 
208. Id. at 1045 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (2006)). 
209. Jd. at 1046-50. 
210. /d. at 1051. 
211. /d. at 1051-52. 
212. See id. at 1051. 
213. /d. at 1054-55. 
214. /d. at 1052-53. 
215. /d. at I 064 (Fletcher, J ., dissenting). 
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"notwithstanding" clause embodied such congressional intent.216 To 
the contrary, none of Senator McCain's detailed amendments to the 
tax and labor provisions ofERISA were enacted.217 Additionally, the 
year following passage of the MYRA, Congress actually amended 
ERISA through the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA) to add an 
anti-alienation exception to ERISA for claims against a pension plan 
based on breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the plan.218 The Senate 
Report on the TRA noted that ERISA lacked any exception that 
''would permit the offset of a participant's benefit against the amount 
owed to a plan by the participant as a result of a breach of fiduciary 
duty to the plan or criminality involving the plan .... "219 If the 
MYRA, passed in 1996, really did create an ERISA anti-alienation 
exception to allow recovery from a participant whose "criminality 
involv[ed] the plan," it seems unlikely that in 1997, the House and 
Senate Reports would have stated the opposite. 
As discussed above, the 1997 ERISA amendments that exclude 
offsets for crimes or breaches of fiduciary duty owed to the plan 
contain detailed and explicit requirements.220 In comparison, the 
MYRA's "notwithstanding" clause is relatively bare.221 According to 
the Novak dissent, "the majority creates a world in which it is more 
difficult to attach the ERISA-covered pension benefits of individuals 
who have committed crimes against pension funds than it is to 
garnish the ERISA-covered benefits of individuals who have 
committed other offenses. "222 
Comparing the majority and dissenting opinions in Novak 
underscores the difficulty of trying to impute a single legislative 
purpose to two coordinate legislative bodies comprised of over 500 
individuals. 223 The majority opmton might constitute an 
impermissible departure from Guidry; as pointed out by the dissent, if 
Congress wanted assignment and alienation exceptions beyond 
QDROs and recoveries for wrongs against the plan itself, such 
exceptions should have been drafted to clearly indicate an abrogation 
216. !d. at 1065. 
217. !d. 
218. See discussion supra Part lli.A.4. 
219. REVENUE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1997, S. REP. No. 105-33, at 310 (1997), quoted in 
Novak, 476 F.3d at 1072 (Fletcher, J., dissenting); see also H.R REP. No. 105-220, at 
756-57 (1997) (Conf. Rep.). 
220. See discussion supra Part lli.A.4. 
221. Novak, 476 F.3d at 1072-73 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
222. !d. at 1073. 
223. Compare id. at 1041-64 (majority opinion), with id. at 1064-77 (Fletcher, J., 
dissenting). 
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of ERISA's anti-alienation provision.224 Still, the majority arguably 
accomplishes a gut-level result that just seems fair: providing crime 
victims with a means of recovery even if the criminal has nothing but 
pension plan assets. After all, depending on the sentence imposed, 
the criminal might never be able to use his pension funds. The 
obvious problem with such reasoning is that it ignores the Supreme 
Court's repeated admonitions against climbing the slippery slope of 
equity to judicially craft ERISA anti-alienation exceptions. 225 
Even more recently, a district court rejected a convicted criminal's 
attempt to invoke the protection of ERISA's anti-alienation 
provisions to shield pension benefits from the MVRA.226 In United 
States v. Miller,227 the owners and operators of an adult care facility 
defrauded one of the facility's elderly residents. 228 Defendant Charles 
Miller entered a plea of guilty to charges that included conspiracy to 
commit bank fraud, identity theft, access fraud, and mail fraud. 229 
Following entry of a restitution order of almost $150,000, the United 
States Attorney sought to garnish Miller's $1,715.72 monthly pension 
benefit.230 Miller's objections to garnishment included an argument 
that ERISA's spendthrift provisions prohibited the government from 
seizing any portion of his pension benefits. 231 The Magistrate's 
report and recommendations, which the district court adopted,232 
relied in large measure on the Ninth Circuit's en bane decision in 
Novak, particularly the court's holding that the MVRA allowed 
garnishment of pension benefits where the "defendant has a current, 
unilateral right to receive payments under the terms of the retirement 
plan."233 The district judge noted that the court was joining 
"'[ d]istrict courts across the country ... "' in refusing to regard 
224. The Novak majority opinion gains no support from the Pension Protection Act of2006 
(PPA), Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). In this highly publicized pension reform 
enactment, the only reference to ERISA's anti-alienation provision involves a 
direction to the Department of Labor to issue regulations regarding the timing and 
modification ofQDROs. See Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1001, 120 Stat. at 1052-53. 
225. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432,447 (1999); Patterson v. Shumate, 
504 U.S. 753, 765 (1992); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'! Pension Fund, 493 
U.S. 365, 375-76 (1990). 
226. United States v. Miller, 588 F. Supp. 2d 789, 797 (W.D. Mich. 2008). 
227. 588 F. Supp. 2d 789. 
228. !d. at 791. 
229. !d. 
230. !d. at 791-92. 
231. !d. at 791. 
232. !d. at 792-93. 
233. Miller, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (quoting Novak, 476 F.3d at 1043). 
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ERISA' s anti-alienation provision as an impediment to garnishing a 
criminal's pension plan distributions where the MVRA created an 
exception to anti-alienation. 234 
As observed by the district court judge in Novak, the federal circuit 
and district courts have presented a relatively unified front in treating 
the MYRA as an express exception to ERISA's spendthrift 
provisions. 235 The difficulty with such an assault is that, despite its 
apparent logic and arguable fairness, the courts nevertheless are 
filling in the legislative gaps to write an MYRA-based exception to 
ERISA. Careful reading of the majority's en bane opinion in Novak 
reveals that the textual underpinning for its decision is premised to an 
extraordinary degree on the MYRA's assertion that its application is 
"[n]otwithstanding any other Federal law."236 Given the Supreme 
Court's past insistence on express congressional exceptions to 
ERISA's spendthrift provisions, it seems likely that such gap-filling 
would be declared invalid. 
V. QUARRELS AND ADDLED EGGS237-THE ELEPHANT IN 
THE ROOM-WITH AN EGG 
Equity considerations persistently creep into ERISA's bar on 
assignment and alienation. 238 In spite of the Supreme Court's 
prohibition against equitable tinkering, 239 significant numbers of the 
remaining judiciary whose chambers are not one block east of the 
Capitol appear unable to resist the lure of attempting to do justice. 
Combating this occupational hazard seems to be a difficult task, 
particularly when a victim's restitutionary rights are at stake. But one 
person's leafy ground cover may be someone else's kudzu. As 
Justice Blackmun cautioned more than once, ERISA's anti-alienation 
provision "'reflects a considered congressional policy choice, a 
decision to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners (and their 
dependents, who may be, and perhaps usually are, blameless), even if 
that decision prevents others from securing relief for the wrongs done 
them. "'240 
234. !d. at 796. 
235. United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1044-53 (9th Cir. 2007) (en bane). 
236. !d. 
237. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET 130, act 3, sc. I (Alan Durband, ed., 
Barron's Educational Series, Inc. 1984) ("Thy head is as full of quarrels as an egg is 
full of meat, and yet thy head hath been beaten as addle as an egg for quarrelling."). 
238. See, e.g., Novak, 476 F.3d at 1045-46. 
239. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990). 
240. Patterson v. Shumante, 504 U.S. 753, 765 (1992) (quoting Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376); 
see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432,447 (1999). 
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The facts in Novak underscore Justice Blackmun's caution because 
there are few reasons to sympathize with Raymond Novak or his ex-
wife: two white-collar criminals who got caught. 241 As an almost 
instinctive reaction, many people (regardless of legal training) would 
fmd it fair and proper to deprive this greedy pair of their pensions, 
even though the relevant decisions say nothing about whether the 
Novaks had innocent dependents who might be forced to suffer too. 
In a case such as Novak, where criminals defrauded a business but 
did no direct harm to individuals, it becomes somewhat difficult to 
articulate the policy supporting restitution. Depleting Novak's 
retirement accounts will make his ex-wife's former employer, Nestle 
Food Company, wealthier by the approximately $140,000 in Novak's 
fully vested pension benefit with May Company's retirement and 
profit-sharing plans-a mere pittance for Nestle. Upon closer 
consideration, it might seem as if society is exalting punishment as 
the prevailing policy, rather than preserving retirement assets or even 
compensating victims. Perhaps the facile slide from restitution to 
retribution is part ofwhat worried Justice Blackmun in Guidry. 242 
Meanwhile, Nestle's shareholders, officers, directors, employees, 
and perhaps creditors likely would be appalled if anyone suggested 
protecting Novak's retirement assets, even though they were worth 
only approximately $140,000-after all, the Novaks' scheme cost 
Nestle over $3.3 million. 243 If the anti-alienation provisions were 
construed too broadly and thereby protected individual retirees' 
pension funds to the detriment of a corporation or its creditors, every 
employee with larcenous propensities would receive the resultant 
message as if it were printed in the company newsletter. Allowing 
ERISA's anti-alienation provisions to eclipse the MYRA might 
obscure some ofthe deterrent effect ofhaving to make restitution. In 
addition, ERISA's legislative history declared its "most important 
purpose" to be "assur[ing] American workers ... [the ability to] look 
forward with anticipation to a retirement with financial security and 
dignity, and without fear that this period of life will be lacking in the 
necessities to sustain them as human beings within our society. "244 
Holding criminals fmancially accountable could help further fmancial 
security of the non-criminal element, while "restor[ing] credibility 
and faith in the private pension plans .... "245 
241. 476 F.3d at 1043. 
242. See Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376-77. 
243. Novak, 476 F.3d at 1043-44. 
244. S. REP. No. 93-127, at 11 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.AN. 4838,4849. 
245. /d. 
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Using the MVRA to create an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation 
provision also could strengthen ERISA's goal of protecting pensions. 
By forcing the criminal to bear the burden of his crimes without any 
protection for his pension plan assets, society might reduce the risk-
sharing that otherwise would be borne by innocent victims. Assume 
that Cl criminal cleverly filled her retirement plans coffers, but 
retained few liquid assets. Failing to require the criminal to use 
pension funds to reimburse her victim could adversely affect the 
victim's own non-retirement savings-thus eroding the third leg of 
the victim's retirement fund stool. To the extent that the victim 
lacked sufficient assets to compensate for her fmancial loss, the 
federal fisc likely would be called on to underwrite the victim's loss 
from criminal activity. Naturally, a contrary argument could be made 
that the government would similarly have to subsidize the criminal's 
retirement if her pension and private savings were to be depleted for 
restitution. 
An additional question involves examining why the ability to 
invade a miscreant's retirement fund should depend on the existence 
of a federal criminal adjudication, rather than a state court conviction. 
Victims have little if any say as to which arm of the government 
chooses to prosecute?46 It is difficult to imagine a policy that would 
support restitution to the victim when the United States Attorney 
elects to proceed with a case, but no restitution if an equivalent crime 
with concurrent state jurisdiction is handled by the state prosecutor. 
The basic premise of retirement income security involves two 
components: ( 1) a minimum standard of living, and (2) lifestyle 
maintenance. 247 Typically Social Security is cited as the source of the 
basic life needs, while retirement plans and personal savings are seen 
as providing augmenting funds to enable the retirees to maintain or 
approach a pre-retirement lifestyle.248 In view of these two levels of 
funding, which might be thought of as "base" and "surplus," it seems 
curious that alienation of a criminal's pension plan assets has been 
approached consistently as an aU-or-nothing proposition. As 
indicated above, unless the driving policy in alienation of otherwise 
protected retirement funds is retribution, there is little reason to 
design a system for accessing a convicted criminal's retirement assets 
around the criminal's lifestyle. Although the criminal's retirement 
means should be a consideration, it should be an ancillary concern 
when compared to her victim's needs. 
246. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
247. Eason, supra note 4, at 177. 
248. See id. at 184. 
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Finally, since its enactment, .ERISA has allowed participant plan 
loans.249 Regardless of whether the MVRA or an equivalent law is 
ever modified to encompass state court restitution orders, plan 
participants frequently have rather extensive rights to draw on their 
plan benefits prior to retirement. 250 Although the tax penalty can be 
substantial, pre-retirement plan participants have the flexibility to use 
the funds if necessary. 251 If a criminal participant is free to borrow 
against her plan to buy a Porsche or add a home theatre to her 
summer cottage, it is difficult to explain why the legal system should 
not be able to "require" that same individual to borrow from plan 
assets to pay restitution. If a MVRA case reaches the Supreme Court 
and a majority of the Justices agrees with the type of reasoning 
expressed by the Novak dissent/52 these questions could be more 
than just idle curiosities. 
Senator McCain's proposed legislation provided a comprehensive 
and effective amendment to ERISA that would have established a 
criminal restitution exception to ERISA' s anti-alienation provision. 253 
249. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (2006). 
250. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
251. See 29 U.S.C. § ll08(b)(l) (2006); I.R.C. § 72(p)(l)(A) (2006). 
252. United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1064-77 (9th Cir. 2006) (Fletcher, J., 
dissenting). 
253. S. 1570, I 04th Cong. (1996): 
(l) IN GENERAL-Section 206(d) of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. l056(d)) is 
amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: 
'(4)(A) Paragraph (I) shall not apply to a qualified criminal 
restitution order and each pension plan shall provide for payments 
in accordance with the applicable requirements of a qualified 
criminal restitution order. 
'(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term 'qualified 
criminal restitution order' means a judgment, order, or decree--
'(i) which is issued by a Federal or State court in connection 
with a criminal conviction of a participant under a plan, 
'(ii) which imposes a criminal fine on the participant or 
which requires the participant to make restitution to I or more 
victims of the crime for which convicted, 
'(iii)(Q which creates or recognizes a right to attach all or a 
portion of the benefits payable with respect to the participant 
under a plan, or 
'(II) which ~eates or recognizes the existence of a victim's 
right to, or assigns to a victim the right to, receive all or a part of 
those benefits, and 
'(iv) with respect to which the requirements of 
subparagraphs (C) and (D) of paragraph (3) are met (determined 
after application of paragraph (3)(E)), except that in applying such 
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subparagraphs, the term 'criminal restitution order' shall be 
substituted for the term 'domestic relations order'. 
'(C) The requirements of subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) of 
paragraph (3) shall apply to any plan administrator or fiduciary of 
a plan to which this paragraph applies. 
'(D) Rules similar to the rules of subparagraph (J) and (N) 
of paragraph (3) shall apply for purposes of this paragraph.' 
(2) PREEMPTION-Paragraph (7) of section 514(b) of 
such Act (29 U.S.C. 1144(b)(7)) is amended by inserting "or to 
qualified criminal restitution orders (within the meaning of 
section 206(d)(3)(B))" before the period at the end. 
(b) AMENDMENTS TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 
OF 1986-
(1) IN GENERAL-Paragraph (13) of section 401(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to assignment of 
benefits) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph: 
'(C) SPECIAL RULES FOR CRIMINAL RESTITUTION 
ORDERS- Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a qualified 
criminal restitution order (within the meaning of section 414(u)).' 
(2) QUALIFIED CRIMINAL RESTITUTION ORDER-
Section 414 of such Code is amended by adding at the end the 
following new subsection: 
'(u) QUALIFIED CRIMINAL RESTITUTION ORDER-
For purposes of this title-
'(I) IN GENERAL-The term 'qualified criminal 
restitution order' means a judgment, order, or decree-
'(A) which is issued by a Federal or State court in 
connection with a criminal conviction of a participant under a 
plan, 
'(B) which imposes a criminal fine on the participant or 
which requires the participant to make restitution to I or more 
victims of the crime for which convicted, 
'(C)(i) which creates or recognizes a right to attach all or a 
portion of the benefits payable with respect to the participant 
under a plan, or 
'(ii) which creates or recognizes the existence of a victim's 
right to, or assigns to a victim the right to, receive all or a part of 
those benefits, and 
'(D) with respect to which the requirements of paragraphs 
(2) and (3) of subsection (p) are met (determined after application 
of subsection (p )( 4)), except that in applying such paragraphs, the 
term 'criminal restitution order' shall be substituted for the term 
'domestic relations order'. 
'(2) PLAN AND FIDUCIARY-The provisions of 
paragraphs (6) and (7) of subsection (p) shall apply to any plan 
administrator or fiduciary of a plan to which this paragraph 
applies. 
99 
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Congress should enact a provision such as that introduced by Senator 
McCain. Failing to do so will ensure years of future ambiguity over 
whether the MYRA really creates an exception to ERISA's 
spendthrift provisions. Victims deserve better. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
ERISA reflects a congressional policy of providing significant 
protection to a broad range of retirement benefits. The ERISA anti-
alienation provisions have made plan participants' assets difficult, if 
not nearly impossible at times, to access prior to retirement. 
Although the statutory exceptions to anti-alienation have grown over 
the years, the circumstances under which plan participants, the 
federal government, the plans themselves, and third parties are able to 
invade the plan are still quite limited. 
Despite the Supreme Court's repeated refusal to allow application 
of equitable principles to the alienation of plan funds, lower courts 
continue to inject their own concepts of fairness into decisions 
concerning plan benefit alienation. The result is that participants, 
practitioners, and third parties are faced with real uncertainty in many 
situations involving the alienability of a criminal's pension assets. 
Instead of a system of bright-line rules, pension alienation 
determinations frequently depend on tortured readings of statutes and 
inconsistent policy approaches. As long as the courts avoid 
'(3) SPECIAL RULES-Rules similar to the rules of 
paragraphs (9), (10), (11), and (12) of subsection (p) shall apply 
for purposes of this subsection.' 
(3) TAX TREATMENT OF DISTRIBUTIONS-
(A) Section 402(e)(1) is amended by adding the end [sic] 
the following new subparagraph: 
'(C) CRIMINAL RESTITUTION ORDERS-Rules similar 
to the rules of subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall apply to payments 
or distributions to victims of a criminal offense pursuant to a 
qualified criminal restitution order described in section 414(u).' 
(B) Section 72(m)(10) is amended-
(i) by adding at the end the following new sentence: "The 
preceding sentence shall also apply to payments or distributions 
made to victims of a criminal offense pursuant to a qualified 
criminal restitution order described in section 414(u).", and 
(ii) by inserting "or qualified criminal restitution orders" 
after "orders" in the heading. 
(C) Subparagraph (J) of section 402(d)(4) is amended by 
adding at the end the following new sentence: "This subparagraph 
shall also apply to any distributions or payments to victims of a 
criminal offense pursuant to a qualified criminal restitution order 
described in section 414(u)." 
2009] Balancing ERISA's Anti-Alienation Provisions 101 
discussing or analyzing the competing policy interests at stake, the 
contours of alienation will remain vague and somewhat 
unpredictable. 
Congress twice amended ERISA's spendthrift provision, creating 
exceptions for QDR0s254 and for fiduciary breaches involving 
pension plans.255 Although courts have treated the MYRA as an 
exception to ERISA's prohibition against alienation of plan 
benefits/56 the legal support for such treatment is questionable at 
best. Congress should recognize that victims of criminal activity 
deserve to recover from the pension plans of those who have harmed 
them. Enacting appropriate legislation to accomplish this result 
would be relatively straightforward and would foster predictability 
and fairness. 
254. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A); I.R.C. § 401(a)(l3)(B) (2006). 
255. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4); I.R.C. § 401(a)(l3)(C). 
256. See. e.g., United States v. Jaffe, 417 F.3d 259, 266-67 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Himebaugh, No. 02-CR-0077-002-CVE, 2007 WL 1462430 (N.D. Okla. May 17, 
2007). 
